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ABSTRACT
It is now well known that the Sharpe ratio and other related reward-to-risk measures may be
manipulated with option-like strategies. In this paper we derive the general conditions for achieving the
maximum expected Sharpe ratio. We derive static rules for achieving the maximum Sharpe ratio with
two or more options, as well as a continuum of derivative contracts. The optimal strategy rules for
increasing the Sharpe ratio. 
Our results have implications for performance measurement in any setting in which managers
may use derivative contracts. In a performance measurement setting, we suggest that the distribution of
high Sharpe ratio managers should be compared with that of the optimal Sharpe ratio strategy. This has
particular application in the hedge fund industry where use of derivatives is unconstrained and manager
compensation itself induces a non-linear payoff.
The shape of the optimal Sharpe ratio leads to further conjectures. Expected returns being held
constant, high Sharpe ratio strategies are, by definition, strategies that generate regular modest profits
punctunated by occasional crashes. Our evidence suggests that the "peso problem" may be ubiquitous in
any investment management industry that rewards high Sharpe ratio managers.
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21 Introduction
The Sharpe ratio is one of the most common measures of portfolio performance.
William Sharpe developed it in 1966 as a tool for evaluating and predicting the per-
formance of mutual fund managers. Since then the Sharpe ratio, and its close ana-
logues the Information ratio, the squared Sharpe ratio and M-squared, have become
widely used in practice to rank investment managers and to evaluate the attractive-
ness of investment strategies in general. The appeal of the Sharpe measure is clear.
It is an aﬃne transformation of a simple t-test for equality in means of two vari-
ables, the ﬁrst variable being the manager’s time series of returns and the second
being a benchmark.1 The Sharpe ratio is also ubiquitous in academic research as a
metric for bounding asset prices.2
Unfortunately, the Sharpe ratio is prone to manipulation – particularly by strate-
gies that can change the shape of probability distribution of returns. For example,
Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show that non-linear
payoﬀs limit the applicability of the Sharpe ratio to the problem of performance
evaluation. More recently, Bernardo and Ledoit (2000) show that Sharpe ratios are
particularly misleading when the shape of the return distribution is far from nor-
mal.3 Spurgin (2001) shows that managers can improve their expected Sharpe ratio
by selling oﬀ the upper end of the potential return distribution. Other researchers,
recognizing the limitations of the Sharpe ratio and its relatives, have sought al-
ternatives to the reward-to-variability approach. These include stochastic-discount
factor based performance measures (c.f. Chen and Knez (1996)) and more direct
measures of active management skill ( c.f. Grinblatt and Titman (1992)). The litera-
ture on performance evaluation is a large one (c.f. Brown, 2000 reference website),
and much of it has focused on the limitations of standard measures. However, de-
1For a review of its history and use, see Sharpe (1994). For a current textbook discussion and
applications of the Sharpe ratio, see for example, Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1999) p. 754-758, and
back endsheet. For applications in the mutual fund industry, see Morningstar (1993) p.24
2See Cochrane and Saa- Requeno (1999) for a discussion of the application of Sharpe ratios to
current asset pricing research.
3To address this problem they propose a semi-parametric alternative biased on the gain-loss
ratio that, in eﬀect discards the information in the tails of the distribution.
1spite twenty years of academic understanding of the problems of benchmarking and
performance measurement, the Sharpe ratio and its relatives remain fundamental
tools in research and practice.
Inthispaperwetakeadiﬀerentapproachtothelimitationsofreward-to-variability
measures. Rather than pointing out their limitations and proposing alternatives, we
identify a class of strategies that maximize these performance measures, without
requiring any manager skill. We derive rules for achieving the maximum Sharpe ra-
tio when the manager has the freedom to take positions in derivative securities, and
when the manager has a given history of returns. Our analysis shows that the best
static manipulated strategy has a truncated right tail and a fat left tail. The optimal
strategy involves selling out-of-the-money calls and selling out-of-the-money puts
in an uneven ratio that insures a regular return from writing options and a large ex-
posure to extreme negative events. We also show that the best dynamic strategy for
maximizing the Sharpe ratio involves leverage conditional upon underperformance.
The results have a number of implications for investment management. Inter-
est in alternative investments has grown dramatically in the past decade. Hedge
funds in particular have attracted interest by institutional managers and high net
worth individuals. Hedge funds have broad latitude to invest in a range of instru-
ments including derivative securities. Mitchell and Pulvino(2001) documents that
merger arbitrage, a common hedge fund strategy, generates returns that resemble
a short put-short call payoﬀ. Recent research by Agarawal and Naik(2001) shows
that hedge fund managers in general follow a number of diﬀerent styles that are
nonlinear in the returns to relevant indices. In a manner similar to Henriksson
and Merton, Agarawal and Naik use option-like payoﬀs as regressors to capture
these non-linearities. In fact, option-like payoﬀs are inherent in the compensation-
structure of the typical hedge fund contract. Goetzmann,Ingersoll and Ross (2001)
show that the high water mark contract - the most common in the hedge fund indus-
try – eﬀectively leaves the investor short 20% of an at the money call at inception,
and if the fund fares poorly, this becomes an out-of-the money call position.
Although the hedge fund industry is predicted on manager skill, the non-linear
nature of the payoﬀs to some of its most popular strategies, its lack of restrictions
2on use of derivatives, and its asymmetric compensation structure all make perfor-
mance measurement problematic. While some have proposed advanced solutions to
these problems, in this paper we identify a set of strategies that, given the freedom
to invest in derivatives or dynamically rebalance, can dramatically increase most
types of reward-to-risk-based performance measures. While others have shown that
this class of measures is not robust to manipulation, we show how to optimally game
them. As such, our analysis provides guidelines for identifying the strategies that
are most subject to failures in standard performance measurement. Interestingly,
they happen to conform to some well-known hedge fund strategies – M &A arbitrage
being one.
A recent hedge fund scandal highlights the relevance of understanding option-
based techniques for maximizing the Sharpe ratio. According to a Wall Street Jour-
nal account of 2/01/2002, Integral Investment Management, a Dallas-based hedge
fund run by biologist-turned-money manager, Conrad Seghers boasted "the highest
Sharpe ratio in the industry" in 1998. The secret to Seghers success appears to
have been in part, a short position in out-of-the-money puts on U.S. equity indices.
Quoting from the Journal account: "Mr. Seghers and museum oﬃcials recall that he
said Integral would combine the investments in such a way that he could guarantee
proﬁts of 1 percent to 2 percent a month in ﬂat or rising markets. The fund,he said,
could suﬀer losses only if the stocks to which the options were tied dropped more
than 30percent, providing a striking degree of investor protection." As we will show
in this paper, the apparent short put position of Integral Investment Management,
coupled with the implicit short call position of the hedge fund incentive compensa-
tion contract fairly closely resembles the optimal Sharpe ratio contract we derive in
this paper. Had the Chicago Art Institute known ex ante the basis for fund’s high
historical Sharpe ratio, they might not have lost nearly $43 million.
Although hedge funds are a natural industry in which to apply our analysis, the
results are also relevant to more conventional asset classes. For example, Glosten
and Jagannathan (1994) and Low (1999) show that small stocks returns have option-
like characteristics – in particular, when measured against a large stock index, small
stocks are eﬀectively short some fraction of a put. Our analysis shows that this fea-
3ture of small stock returns may enhance their apparent risk-adjusted performance
compared to large stocks.
The intuition behind the solution identiﬁed in this paper is that managers can sell
insurance for extreme states of nature that occur infrequently. As a result, in small
sample, these insurance premia provide steady positive performance that enhances
return without adding risk Mr. Seghers’ "1 percent to 2 percent per month," if
you will. This form of distribution may be especially susceptible to small-sample
problems – it will depend crucially on whether an extreme event has or has not
occurred in the sample period.
Although we derive conditions for maximizing the expected Sharpe ratio, the
small sample properties may well indicate that managers with limited histories fol-
lowing this strategy have extraordinary high relative risk-adjusted performance.
In addition, it implies that small sample might be measured in years, rather than
months, because very infrequent events matter a lot to the measured performance
of a manager pursuing this strategy. While most hedge fund managers have rela-
tively short track records, our study shows that the data demands for performance
evaluation are higher for such managers than for mutual fund managers or others
restricted from derivatives use by regulation or charter.
More broadly, this analysis has implications for the emergence and survival of
asset markets. Markets that provide fat-tailed, left-skew returns will look relatively
attractive under a reward-to-risk metric, and thus may attract disproportionate in-
terest and investment. This is true even in large sample. However, in a setting in
which the existence of the asset market is conditional upon a return threshold, the
attractiveness of a maximal Sharpe ratio distributions is even greater. For example,
consider a market with an MSR distribution that disappears whenever the returns
hit a very low lower bound. Such a market will tend to display highly positive Sharpe
ratios as long as it is in existence. The documented positive Sharpe ratios of the
hedge fund industry, and the short history of the industry are consistent with pro-
viding MSR-distributed returns in small sample.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an example of how supe-
rior investment strategies may actually yield low Sharpe rations. Section 3 provides
4an example of how poor strategies might actually yield high Sharpe ratios. Section
4 derives the maximal Sharpe ratio under a range of conditions from complete mar-
kets to strategies constrained to a pair of strike prices and standard puts and calls.
Section 5 discusses the further implications of the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Type I Error: Low Sharpe Ratios of Great Strategies
In order to identify the optimal strategy for gaming the Sharpe ratio it helps to
know what elements of a "good" strategy may lead to lower values. Why focus
on this element? Because it is easy to eliminate or sell such returns and thereby
artiﬁcially inﬂate a fund manager’s apparent performance.
The Sharpe ratio contains two elements. The numerator, which is the realized
return and the denominator which is the standard deviation. Thus, it is possible to
trade oﬀ high returns for a lower standard deviation and potentially improve the
quotient. In fact, this trade oﬀ implies that a manager may produce a remarkably
small Sharpe ratio even with an undeniably winning strategy.
To see this, consider a simple, perfect-foresight equity investment strategy.
Imagine an analyst who can perfectly pick ﬁrms within each industry, but is un-
able to identify which industry will perform best. Thus, for example, the analyst
can tell you if General Motors will outperform Ford, but not if they will over or
under-perform Intel.
The resulting strategy is quite simple: it shorts the bottom half of the ﬁrms
within each industry and takes a long position in the other half. Net performance is
the diﬀerence between the average buy-and-hold performance of the long portfolio
minus the average buy-and-hold performance of the short portfolio over a period
of one year. Being a zero-investment strategy, performance statistics are computed
from the spread between the return of the long leg minus the return of the short
side. Given the assumption of perfect within-industry foresight, there is no doubt
that the returns of this strategy will always be positive – the only uncertainty is the
variation in the positive return spread. The Sharpe ratio is the time-series mean of
5the net returns divided by the time-series standard deviation.4 Because of this, the
Sharpe ratio turns out to be a particularly poor measure of performance, since all
the variation, in some sense, is positive. Clearly, no human being can produce such
returns. However, the point here is that even somebody with such supernatural
abilities will not fare very well when compared with others via the Sharpe ratio.
The inability of this strategy to produce superior numbers will then help to identify
ways ordinary managers can improve their numbers without improving their actual
predictive abilities.
The Sharpe ratios of these “perfect” portfolios are inﬂuenced by variance across
ﬁrms (“heterogeneity”) and variance across years. A higher variance within industry
means that the sorting ability of an analyst is more valuable. Thus, heterogeneity
produces a higher mean performance. In contrast, time-series variation in hetero-
geneity produces greater time-series return variance, which lowers the Sharpe ratio.
Insert Table 1 Here
Table 1 presents the base case. Analysts are assumed capable of perfect sorting
within 1-digit SIC codes. To qualify for inclusion in the portfolio for a given year,
in December, a ﬁrm must have market capitalization in millions of dollars equal to
the prevailing S&P level divided by 5.0 (this means that a ﬁrm as of the year 2000
must have a market cap above $250million) and a stock market price of $5 or more.
Each ﬁrm must have a valid return in January, available in Research Insight (from
which all data is drawn), traded on a U.S. exchange, and not an ADR. Firms in SIC 9
were also excluded since due to the paucity of ﬁrms with this coding. The data set
begins in 1981 and ends with 1999.
Of course, such returns would be an analyst’s dream. The typical annual return
spread for one analyst is between about 20% and 140%. The typical mean return
for an individual industry is about 64%. However, the return volatilities are not
4When the portfolio is zero-investment, the risk-free rate is not subtracted oﬀ in computing
the Sharpe ratio. A zero-investment portfolio can always be combined with a position in bonds.
This increases the expected rate of return by the interest rate and does not alter the standard
deviation. The Sharpe ratio can then be computed in the usual fashion. Computing Sharpe ratios
in this fashion also permits us to ignore changes in the interest rate over the sample period
6negligible, ranging from a low of 9% for SIC 2 (construction) to 31% for SIC 7 (ﬁnance).
Thus, due to the time-series variation in sorting eﬀectiveness, even though returns
are guaranteed to be positive by the experiment, the Sharpe ratio is still a ﬁgure in
the single digits. For some industries (e.g., SIC 4: utilities), even perfect foresight is
not enough to have oﬀered the analyst much more than a Sharpe ratio of 2.5! Five of
our ten industry portfolios are hard-pressed to achieve a Sharpe ratio signiﬁcantly
above 3. If a fund were to have access to perfect analysts within each industry and
allocated capital equally to each, its performance would have achieved a Sharpe
ratio of only 4.26.
These “perfect portfolios” display smooth performance over the sample period,
because they contain a lot of ﬁrms. Thus, it makes little diﬀerence if we com-
pute Sharpe ratios with annual returns or with monthly returns and then annualize
them.5 For smaller portfolios with more month-to-month variation (but assuming
perfect annual sorting ability), this eﬀect would further lower the Sharpe ratio com-
puted from monthly returns.6
Although the time-series variation problem is familiar to practitioners, its mag-
nitude may not have been. In the realm of equity buy-and-hold strategies, hypo-
thetical strategies often return Sharpe ratios between 1 and 3. Our strategy puts
these numbers into perspective: the scale upon which such unmanipulated equity
buy-and-hold strategies should be judged is not really minus inﬁnity to plus inﬁnity,
but, say, −5t o+5.
Despite the fact that no human being can hope to replicate the perfect foresight
returns from the portfolios analyzed in this section, the resulting Sharpe ratios
are less than spectacular. However, the problem lies not with the strategy or its
high returns, but its highest returns. If the manager could ex post discard all re-
5The more volatile the within-year returns, the lower are the monthly annualized Sharpe ratios
relative to those computed directly from annual returns. To illustrate the point, consider a port-
folio that shows (100%,−40%, 200%, −40%) forever. Thus, the mean is 55%, the standard deviation
is 101.4%. At lower frequency, the portfolio would perform at (20%,80%) forever. The mean is just
slightly lower (55%), the 2 period standard deviation is 30%.
6Variations permitting more frequent perfect foresight, more extreme portfolios, more detailed
industry abilities, or diﬀerent capitalization requirements can expand the range slightly, but typ-
ically yield similar conclusions.
7turns above the minimum realized annual return, then the all returns would be the
same and positive so the Sharpe ratio would be inﬁnite. Such a strategy would not
work in general since, without perfect foresight, the minimum return will usually
be negative, but the same general principle applies. The Sharpe ratio usually can be
improved by eliminating the highest returns. This is the subject of the next section.
3 Type II Error: Using Derivatives To Maximize the Sharpe
Ratio
One eﬃcient way to truncate high returns to is through the use of derivatives. As
we noted in the Chicago Art Institute example above, a strategy tied to a market for
which options exist is particularly susceptible to maximizing Sharpe ratio strategies.
This is particularly easy if the fund’s primary purpose is index enhancement, as
index options are readily available.
3.1 The Maximal Sharpe Ratio in a Complete Market
Consider ﬁrst a market which is complete over all price outcomes or can be made
so with dynamic trading. The standard single-period portfolio problem would be to
maximize expected utility,
 
piu(zi), where pi is the probability at time 0for state
i realized at time T, u(·) is the utility function of the investor, and zi is the total
return (not excess return) in state i. The optimal portfolio, z
◦




i) = θˆ pi/pi (1)
where θ = E[u (z◦)] is the Lagrange multiplier from the budget constraint and ˆ pi
is the risk-neutral probability of state i.7
7We express the budget constraint and hence the optimal portfolio in terms of the risk-neutral
probabilities rather than the state prices for ease of comparison with later results. The risk-neutral
probability of a state is equal to the state price multiplied by the risk-free discount factor.
8Suppose instead that the investor wishes to form a portfolio with the largest
possible Sharpe ratio. Any portfolio can be decomposed into a risk-free asset plus
a risky zero-investment portfolio,   z = erT +   x. Alternatively,   x is the excess return
on the portfolio in question. The Sharpe ratio S of the portfolio is the ratio of the
expected return in excess of interest earned to the standard deviation. In terms of
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TheSharpe-ratio-maximizingportfolioisnotuniquelydeﬁned. Infact, theSharpe
ratio is invariant to scaling by leverage so the same maximum Sharpe ratio can be
achieved at any positive expected excess return
 
pixi = ¯ x ≥ 0. Since ¯ x = 0is
trivially achieved, the mean must not be negative or the Sharpe measure is clearly
not maximized.
As shown in the Appendix, the maximal-Sharpe-ratio excess return in state i for
a portfolio with mean excess return ¯ x is
x
∗






i /pi − 1
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(3)
So the Sharpe-ratio-maximizing payoﬀ is linear in the likelihood ratio of the risk-
neutral probability to the true probability (or state price per unit probability).




i − ¯ x)2 = γ¯ x. Therefore, the










i /pi − 1 . (4)
8Equation (2) and the following results give the true Sharpe ratio of the portfolio. In any period,
the sample Sharpe ratio may diﬀer from this population value. Its distribution and small sample
properties will depend on the probability distribution of the states.
9This ﬁnal sum can also be expressed as
 
pi(ˆ pi/pi)2 so the maximal Sharpe ra-
tio is one less than the expectation of the square of the realized likelihood ratio
considered as a random variable on the states.
If the number of states is ﬁnite or the probability likelihood ratio, ˆ pi/pi, is oth-
erwise bounded above across states, then the maximal Sharpe ratio can be achieved














Since γ is proportional to ¯ x, so is this minimal excess return. Therefore, by set-
ting the mean excess return at a suﬃciently low level, the smallest total return,
x
∗
min + e−rT can be made positive and limited liability is achieved. If there are in-
ﬁnitely many states and the probability likelihood ratio is unbounded, then a limited
liability portfolio with a Sharpe ratio arbitrarily close to the maximal value can be
formed by holding a portfolio with excess return −e−rT (i.e., total return of zero)
in the states with the highest ratios and excess returns proportional to those given
in (3) for the states with lower ratios. Again by setting the mean excess return to
a suﬃciently small number, the fraction of states with a zero return can be made
as small as desired and the resulting Sharpe ratio will be arbitrarily close to that
achieved with an unconstrained portfolio.
We now examine the properties of the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio. From (3)
and (4), the return on the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio in state i is
x
∗






1 − ˆ pi/pi
 
. (6)
So for the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio, the return in each state deviates from
the expected return by an amount proportional to the diﬀerence of the probability
likelihood ratio ˆ pi/pi from 1. States with risk-neutral probability exceeding their
true probability will have smaller than average returns and vice versa. The larger the
deviation between the risk-neutral and true probabilities, the greater the diﬀerence
from the mean return.

















Therefore, the excess return on the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio diﬀers from the
average return by an amount proportional to the diﬀerence between the realized
marginalutilityandtheexpectedmarginalutilityforanoptimallyinvestedportfolio.
In particular, it is monotonically decreasing in the marginal utility. Since utility is
concave, x
∗
i is also monotonically increasing (but not linear) in z
◦
i. For typical utility
functions with u   (·)>0, x∗ will be concave in z◦. That is, the total return including
interest on the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio will exceed z
◦
i in the midportion of
the outcomes and fall short of z
◦
i for very good or very bad outcomes or, usually,
both.
All of these comparisons are meaningful only if the optimal portfolio for the
standard problem is identiﬁed. Note, however, that we do not actually require a
complete market in the Arrow Debreu sense to do this analysis. Take any portfolio
or asset with a particular pattern of returns to use as a basis. Next, determine the
maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio which can be constructed by trading a complete set
of derivative claims contingent on it. By using a basis asset as a benchmark it now
becomes possible to derive other standard performance measures.
Let B denote the excess return on a benchmark index. The covariance of the
Sharpe-ratio-maximizing portfolio with the benchmark is
Cov[x
∗,B]= E[(x



























9The utility function used here can be any for which the standard problem has an “interior”
solution.





























where SB is the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark. Of course, the alpha is subject to
severe manipulation. It can be made as large as desired by levering the portfolio to
increase it’s mean return.10
Other performance measures related to the Sharpe ratio have also been pro-
posed. Modigliani and Modigliani’s [1997] M-squared is measured relative to some
benchmark, B, usually an index like the S&P 500. It is the expected rate of return
that would be earned on a portfolio if it were levered so its standard deviation were












Clearly maximizing the Sharpe ratio also maximizes the M-squared measure for any
benchmark.
Sharpe’s [1981] information ratio is the ratio of the excess return to the stan-
dard deviation measured relative to some risky benchmark in place of the risk-free
asset. The information ratio for a portfolio with excess returns, x with respect to a






10This is always true and not a particular problem with this structure. The Treynor measure,
T ≡ α/β, was introduced to avoid this problem. Like the Sharpe measure, the Treynor measure is
unaﬀected by leverage. The Treynor measure for the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio is









which does not depend on the mean ¯ x. Of course, the Treynor measure has its own manipulation
problem. It can be made as large as desired by reducing the beta.
12This is just the Sharpe ratio for the quantity x − B instead of the excess return
x alone. Since both the excess return x∗ and the benchmark excess return B can
be purchased at a zero cost, so can the portfolio with excess return x∗∗ = x∗ + B.
Clearly this latter portfolio has the maximal information ratio which is equal in
value to the maximal Sharpe ratio derived earlier, I∗ =S ∗.
The next section analyzes this problem in a exponential-normal model where the
mean-variance analysis is usually justiﬁed.
3.2 The Maximal Sharpe Ratio for a Normal Benchmark
In this section, we analyze the maximal Sharpe ratio problem for a benchmark (mar-
ket) portfolio with a normally distributed return. Let ξ denote the return on a port-
folio which is to be used as a comparison basis. This portfolio might be taken to be
the market portfolio, but it need not be. We assume that any derivative asset based
on ξ can be traded, so the market can be completed with respect to states deﬁned
over outcomes of ξ.
For a continuous state space, analysis similar to that leading to (4) yields a max-













which is achieved by a portfolio with an excess return of
x
∗(ξ) = ¯ x + γ[1 − ˆ p(ξ)/p(ξ)] (14)
where γ = ¯ x/S2
∗ and p and ˆ p(ξ) are the true and risk-neutral probability densities
for the state space.
The likelihood ratio ˆ p(ξ)/p(ξ) can be determined as in (1) from the utility func-
tion of the representative investor who holds the benchmark
ˆ p(ξ)/p(ξ) = u
 (ξ)/E[u
 (ξ)] . (15)
13The typical conjugate assumption for a normal distribution is exponential utility.
In this case the probability likelihood ratio is11

















− 1 = exp(S
2
ξ) − 1 (17)
where Sξ is the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark index. The maximal Sharpe ratio
clearlyexceedsthebenchmark’sSharperatio, andthelargerthebenchmark’sSharpe
ratio, the larger is the diﬀerence. For example, the annual Sharpe ratio of the S&P
500 index was 0.450 from 1926 – 2000. Assuming normality, the maximal Sharpe
ratio is 0.474, which is 5% higher. For a benchmark Sharpe of 0.6, the maximal
Sharpe ratio is 0.658, almost 10% higher.
The ﬁnal column in Table ?? shows the maximal Sharpe ratio that can be obtained
for normally distributed returns. For example, for an index Sharpe ratio of 1.00, the
maximal Sharpe ratio is 1.31.
The return on the Sharpe-ratio-maximizing portfolio deviates substantially from
normal. The return is
x











1 + exp[(µ − R)2/σ2]

 . (18)
This is increasing in the index, but it is bounded above by x∗
max ≡ ¯ x(1 + [1 +
exp(S2
∗)]−1) and unbounded below. The return has a “reﬂected” lognormal dis-
tribution; i.e., x∗
max − x∗ is lognormally distributed.
11For exponential utility, u (ξ) = e−aξ, the representative investor will hold the benchmark
portfolio unlevered for a = (µ − R)/σ2. For this investor, E[u (ξ)] = exp[−(µ2 − R2)/σ2].





143.3 The Maximal Sharpe Ratio for a Lognormal Basis
This section analyzes the maximal Sharpe ratio problem in a continuous-state log-
normal environment. This permits the use Black-Scholes option-pricing techniques
to determine the risk-neutral probabilities which yields speciﬁc numerical results.
Assume that ξ has a lognormal distribution with an instantaneous expected rate
of return of µ and a logarithmic variance of σ2 per unit time. The risk-neutral prob-
ability distribution is the same with µ replaced by r, the continuously-compounded












The maximal Sharpe ratio is increasing in the absolute value of the instantaneous
risk premium of the basis, µ−r, and decreasing in its standard deviation. Increasing
both the risk premium and the standard deviation proportionally leaves the max-
imal Sharpe ratio unchanged. The maximal Sharpe ratio is also increasing in the
investment horizon, T, because lengthening the horizon is equivalent to increasing
the risk premium and the variance (not the standard deviation) proportionally.14











This ratio is also increasing in the risk premium and decreasing in the standard
deviation of the index. For realistic parameter values, it is increasing in the invest-
ment horizon for T up to about ten years: a longer horizon than will be used in
most conceivable circumstances.15
13This formula is very similar to (17). However, (µ−r)/σ is not the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark
in this case since µ,r, and σ are the instantaneous parameters. The Sharpe ratio of the index is
given below.
14The investment horizon T is the interval over which one return is measured not the entire
period of data. For example, if ﬁve years of monthly returns are used to compute the average and
standard deviation, then the horizon is one month and not ﬁve years.
15T represents the investment horizon or rebalancing interval of the decision maker. It is com-
monly assumed that the Sharpe measure is proportional to the square root of this horizon. How-
15Insert Table 2 Here
Table 2 shows the Sharpe ratio for the basis and for the optimized portfolio
for various parameter values. The maximum improvement beyond that available
on the basis is larger the larger is the Sharpe ratio of the basis itself. So a higher
risk premium or a smaller volatility on the basis allows for a greater percentage
manipulation of the Sharpe ratio. Also substantially more improvement is possible
over a one-year horizon than over a monthly horizon. This result follows because
the maximal Sharpe ratio increases at a faster rate than the basis Sharpe ratio with
the investment horizon.
To put these numbers into context, consider the expected rate of return required
by the index for it to produce a Sharpe ratio equal to S∗. Set the index Sharpe ratio in
(20) equal to the maximal Sharpe ratio and solve for µ to determine the “apparent”
return on the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio










For example, if the basis risk premium of µ−r equals 10% and the volatility 20%, the
13.1% improvement in the annual Sharpe ratio is apparently equivalent to an extra
return of 146 basis points on the index. The other values for µapp are given in the
table. These are economically meaningful numbers; however, we have been careful
to label them apparent out-performance because there is no actual out-performance
implied.
ever, this is precisely true only if the expected return and variance are proportional to the interval.
Because it is the logarithmic variance and the continuously-compounded expected rate of return
which are proportional to the horizon, the index and maximal Sharpe ratios actually grow slower
and faster than the square root of the time interval, respectively, as can be seen from a Taylor























16The excess return x∗ on the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio is from (14) and (48)
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This payoﬀ is illustrated in Figure 1 for µ = 15%, r = 5%, σ = 15%, and T = 1. The
return shown has the same expected value as that on the index, i.e., ¯ x = eµT − erT.
Note that the maximal-Sharpe-ratio return is substantially less than that on the
index in both tails. The maximal-Sharpe-ratio return exceeds that on the index only
over the range from about −4% to 25%. Of course, this central range does account
for nearly 60% of the probability distribution.
Insert Figure 1 Here
Because ξ is lognormally distributed, ξ to any power is as well, and x∗(ξ) will






























The maximal Sharpe ratio return has a reﬂected lognormal distribution bounded
above by ¯ x + γ and with an inﬁnite left rather than right tail.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The distribution of returns on this portfolio is shown in Figure 2 along with that
of the index. Again, they are constructed to have the same expected payoﬀ, and the
parameters used are µ = 15%, r = 5%, σ = 15%, T = 1. The variance of the return


























17The most obvious feature of the distribution is its long left tail giving rise to negative
skewness and high kurtosis.
Because both distributions are lognormal, all other moments are determined by
the means and variances. In particular the normalized third and fourth moments
are
E[(ξ − ¯ ξ)3]
(Var[ξ])
3/2 = (ωξ + 2)
 
ωξ − 1
E[(ξ − ¯ ξ)4]
(Var[ξ])







E[(x∗ − ¯ x∗)3]
(Var[x∗])
3/2 =− (ωx + 2)
 
ωx − 1
E[(x∗ − ¯ x∗)4]
(Var[x∗])





where ωξ ≡ eσ2T and ωx ≡ eσ2T/δ2
.
Table 3 shows the skewness and kurtosis of the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio
and the basis portfolio for basis volatilities of σ = 15%, 20%, and 25% and horizons
of one month and one year.
Insert Table 3 Here
The equation for the maximal Sharpe ratio and the maximizing portfolio are
completely general; however, many of the speciﬁc results here depend on the log-
normal distribution assumption. For example, suppose instead the index has a
log-Laplace distribution, p(ξ) = (2βξ)−1 exp(−|lnξ − α|/β). In this case, the
maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio is
x
















3 exp[(α − ˆ α)/β] +
1
3 exp[−2(α − ˆ α)β)] − 1
(27)
where ˆ α is the risk-neutral value of the location parameter α.16
16The logarithmic variance of the return is Var[lnξ] = 2β2. The continuously compounded
expected rate of return is µ =
1
T [α − ln(1 − β2)). Therefore, the risk-neutral mean parameter is
ˆ α = rT + ln(1 − β2) so α − ˆ α = (µ − r)T.
18As with lognormality, the maximal-Sharpe-ratio is increasing in the risk-premium
and decreasing in the logarithmic variance of the basis. Also the return on the
maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio is increasing in the return on the index and has an
upper bound. However, in this case, the upper bound is achieved and the returns
are equal for all ξ ≥ eα. A more striking diﬀerence is that this maximal-Sharpe-ratio
portfolio also has a lower bound, and its payoﬀ is again constant for all ξ ≤ eˆ α.S o
for a log-Laplace distribution, the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio eliminates both
tails of the distribution.
3.4 Maximizing the Sharpe Ratio With One Call and One Put
InpracticeamoneymanagermaynotbeabletoconstructtheSharpe-ratio-maximizing
portfolio because a complete market in contingent claims does not exist or because
it may be too expensive to trade or dynamically create too many options. However,
even if the manager is allowed to trade only one or two ordinary put and call op-
tions, he can signiﬁcantly enhance his Sharpe ratio. Furthermore, these two options
will typically be liquid (near-the-money) options.
Suppose a money manager invests $1 in the index, purchases κ European puts
with a strike of K and sells η European calls with the strike of H (H>K ) to create
the following simple linear return pattern
P =

   
   
ξ + κ(K − ξ) ξ ≤ K
ξ K<ξ<H
ξ − η(ξ − H) H ≤ ξ.
(28)
Many interesting patterns are included here. For example, writing covered calls is
equivalent to κ = 0and η = 1. Buying portfolio insurance is equivalent to κ = 1
and η = 0. Partial write programs, partial insurance, and combinations are also
included.
19What are the mean, variance, and Sharpe ratio of the portfolio P? The non-central















Using (53) and (54) for z = (µ −
1
2σ2)T and v2 = σ2T, we have
E[P] = κKΦ(−h
−
K) + (1 − κ)e
µT · Φ(−hK) + e
µT · [Φ(hK) − Φ(hH)]
+ HηΦ(h
−
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where P0 is the initial value of the portfolio.
The initial value of the portfolio is
P0 = 1 + κP(1,T;K)− ηC(1,T;H) (32)
where P(·) and C(·) are the formulas for a put and a call; in this case the Black-
Scholes formulas. The Sharpe ratios for portfolios holding just one option are given
by setting κ or η to zero. The Sharpe ratios for portfolios holding options at more
20than two strikes can be computed similarly. However, as shown below, only one or
two options are required to achieve most of the possible improvement in the Sharpe
ratio.
Insert Figure 3 Here
Figure 3 shows the Sharpe ratio for using a single call in various combinations
with the basis for parameter values r = 5%, µ = 15%, σ = 15%, T = 1. For these
parameters the Sharpe ratio for the stock is 0.631. By selling 0.843 calls at a strike
of 1.0098,17 the Sharpe ratio can be pushed to 0.731. Using two strikes allows
an improvement of the Sharpe ratio to 0.743. This portfolio is characterized by
κ =− 2.58, K = 0.88, η = 0.77, H = 1.12. The maximal Sharpe ratio is 0.748, so 86%
of the total possible increase in the Sharpe ratio can be achieved with one option
contract and 96% can be achieved with just two option contracts.
The improvement in the Sharpe ratio is not critically sensitive to the exact value
of the strike price. For example, a Sharpe ratio of 0.716 or 0.694 can be achieved by
using a call which is 5% in- or out-of-the-money in place of the best single call with a
strike 1% in-the-money. A Sharpe ratio of 0.737 can be achieved using both of these
options. Near-the-money options are very liquid and seldom is the strike price gap
as large as 10%. Therefore, simple puts and calls should be able to provide most of
the improvement possible in the Sharpe ratio.
Insert Figure 4 Here
Figure 4 plots the payoﬀ on the put-call-stock portfolio and compares it to that on
the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio.18 The distributions are similar in many respects
17Selling 5.36 puts at the same strike gives identical results. By put-call parity holding a share and
buying κ puts is equivalent to holding a share and buying a portfolio long κ calls, short κ shares,
andlongbonds. Thenetpositionisκ callsand1−κ shares. Eliminatingtheleveragewhichdoesnot
aﬀect the Sharpe ratio gives κ/(1−κ)calls for each share. Because −5.36/(−5.36−1) = 0.843 = η,
the positions are equivalent.
18The illustrated best put and call portfolio does not appear to be a “best” ﬁt for the curve de-
scribing the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio for the simple reason it is not best ﬁt for the illustrated
curve.
21though the returns on the option portfolio are larger for both very high and low re-
turns on the basis. This means that the option portfolio has less negative skewness
and typically more kurtosis than the maximal Sharpe ratio portfolio.
3.5 Dynamic Optimization (Existing Return History)
Once the measurement period has begun, leverage can be used to further enhance
the recorded Sharpe ratio. Consider a money manager who has an existing history
of returns with realized average excess return, ¯ xh and Sharpe ratio, Sh. He wishes
to maximize the Sharpe ratio measured from these and future returns. Since the
variance can be expressed as a function of the Sharpe ratio and mean excess return,
the total-period Sharpe ratio is
S=









f ) − [α¯ xh + (1 − α)¯ xf]2
(33)
where ¯ xf and Sf are the expected excess return and Sharpe ratio in the future and
α is the fraction of the total period which has passed.
From (33), the entire-period Sharpe ratio is monotonic in Sf so the maximal-
Sharpe-ratio portfolio should always be employed, Sf =S ∗. The only remaining
question is how much leverage should be used.
Insert Figure 5 Here
Figure 5 illustrates the leverage problem for various conditions. The parameters
are α = 0.4,S∗ = 0.6,σ h = 15%. The ﬁve curves show the entire-period Sharpe
ratio plotted against the expected excess return in the future for historical average
excess returns of ¯ xh =− 2%, 2%, 6%, 10%, and 14%.
As illustrated for ¯ xh =− 2%, extreme leverage (¯ xf →∞ ) should be employed
whenever the history has a negative average excess return. Fortunately, the Sharpe
ratio does not depend strongly on the expected excess return for high values, so in
practice the leverage need not be extreme to reap most of the beneﬁts.
22If the return history has a positive average excess return, the proper strategy is
not to eliminate all excess returns in the future even if ¯ xh and Sh are very large.
Doing so would lower the entire-period mean and usually increase the variance.
As shown in the Appendix, the portfolio should be levered so the expected excess
return in the future is
¯ x
∗








This equation says the expected return in the future should be set near the
historical mean. In fact, if the historical Sharpe ratio equals the maximal Sharpe
ratio, the portfolio should be levered so its expected excess return is equal to the
historical average excess return. To do otherwise increases the variance and thereby
reduces the entire-period Sharpe ratio since the variance is measured as the squared
deviations around the weighted mean.
Note that in Figure 5 the historical standard deviation is held constant at 15%
across the diﬀerent ¯ xh curves rather than the Sharpe ratio. Therefore, as the histor-
ical average increases from 2% to 14%, the historical Sharpe ratio rises from 0.133 to
0.933. This accounts for the decrease in the optimal leverage. The historical returns
have diﬀerent weight in the entire period standard deviation and expected return
so increasing the leverage increases the former at a faster rate. This means that
with a higher past Sharpe ratio, using leverage to lower the entire period variance
gives more beneﬁt than increasing the expected excess return.
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for Sh > 0 .
(35)
Insert Figure 6 Here
Figure 6 illustrates the Sharpe ratio that can be achieved with the proper strategy.
The maximal Sharpe ratio in the future is 0.6. The entire-period Sharpe ratio is,
of course, increasing in the historical Sharpe ratio. If the historical Sharpe ratio
23exceeds the maximal Sharpe ratio, then the entire-period Sharpe ratio is decreasing
in α since this good result will have more of an impact on the entire-period Sharpe
ratio. The converse also holds.
The entire-period Sharpe ratio is constant for Sh < 0and nearly linear for Sharpe
ratios above 0.3 In fact, the plot is very much like the price of an option. Further-
more, by analogy with option pricing, a strategy which produces a volatile Sharpe
measure early on will therefore be a desired one. The money manager can recover
from a bad performance by using leverage in the future. If he has a good perfor-
mance early in the evaluation period, he can be more conservative.
4 Implications
Our analysis has direct, practical implications for regulation, performance auditing
and agency contracting. In this sense it relates to the growing literature on agency
in money management (c.f. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Carpenter (2000) and
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2001)) . In settings in which the Sharpe ratio is used
explicitly or implicitly for benchmarking, the use of options, or dynamic replication
of derivative payoﬀs, should be may need to be constrained. Otherwise managers
may take actions that may not coincide with their investors’ interests. Further, it
may pay those allocating assets to compare the distribution of high Sharpe ratio
managers with those that can be obtained via an optimal manipulation strategy.
In settings for which the use of options is unconstrained, asymmetric performance
contracts similar to those used in the hedge fund industry appear to mitigate certain
moral hazard problems raised by the use of Sharpe ratios.
The analysis presented here also has applications for the use of Sharpe ratios in
asset pricing. Low (1999) ﬁnds that large a class of U.S. equities have asymmetric
exposure to the index. Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) liken this structural rela-
tionship to a derivative-based strategy. In eﬀect, some assets in the U.S. market,
primarily small cap stocks, behave as if they are short a put. Our analysis shows
24that in this case, the Sharpe and Information ratios are potentially biased measures
of the attractiveness of an investment.
There may be corporate ﬁnance implications for these results as well. To the
extent that a corporate manager is evaluated against an explicit benchmark, our
strategy shows that he or she has an incentive to choose a capital structure that
mimics the payoﬀ of the maximal Sharpe ratio. In the corporate setting, this would
mean simultaneously issuing out-of-the-money call warrants and put warrants in
a particular proportion. The former is common for certain types of ﬁrms. The
latter is rare, but not unknown. Our paper provides at least one explanation for the
existence of put warrants. In fact, even in settings where the corporate manager
is evaluated not on stock returns but on the risk-scaled deviations of corporate
earnings against a contemporaneous benchmark, our analysis suggests managers
will smooth out large positive income realizations, while recognizing large negative
hits.
Theresultshaveimplicationsfordynamicportfoliomanagement. Brown, Harlow
and Starks (1996) show that mutual fund managers increase variance after a poor
showing in the ﬁrst half of the year. While Jeﬀrey Busse (1999) disputes this evi-
dence using daily data, our results in this paper suggest that this dynamic behavior
is consistent with maximizing the Sharpe ratio. If our conjecture about hedge fund
compensation is correct, we would expect to ﬁnd less dynamic gaming in an industry
with asymmetric contracts. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2000) ﬁnd some evidence
that hedge fund managers increase volatility when they underperform other funds,
but not when they underperform a ﬁxed benchmark; thus, the existing empirical
evidence is mixed.
Our analysis also has a number of subtle implications concerning the timing of
reporting and performance measurement. In particular, the longer the reporting
horizon, the more freedom the manager has to discard or shift high returns. For
example, for a fund with a monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.6, the fund only wants to
discard monthly returns more than 1.54 standard deviations above the mean, and
only 5% of the fund’s return are wasted. However, if the same fund’s performance
was measured directly from its annual returns, the fund would want to discard
25annual returns above –1.14 standard deviations above the mean, and over 60% of
the fund’s mean return would be wasted.
The shape of the optimal Sharpe ratio leads to further conjectures. Expected
returns being held constant, high Sharpe ratio strategies are, by deﬁnition, strate-
gies that generate regular, modest proﬁts punctuated by occasional crashes. Our
evidence suggests that the “peso problem” may be ubiquitous in any investment
management industry that rewards high Sharpe ratios.
5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on methods to manipulate portfolio returns to achieve high
Sharpe ratios and related measures. It derives the optimal strategy under certain
conditions and shows that the payoﬀ structure resembles a portfolio that is short
diﬀerent fractions of out-of-the-money puts and calls, such that the fund distribu-
tion is left skewed. This result poses problems in the measurement and monitor-
ing of investment funds and perhaps corporations in general because it distorts
manager incentives. Some distortion may be mitigated by restricting the use of
derivatives in the portfolio. In unconstrained settings, however, it may be wiser
change incentives to asymmetrically reward managers based upon upside perfor-
mance, however giving a 20percent call on the fund to the hedge fund manager
further distorts reward-to-risk based performance measurement. This compensa-
tion structure has evolved in the hedge fund universe, where portfolio composition
is not monitored, but Sharpe ratios and Information ratios are widely used.
26A Maximal-Sharpe-Ratio Portfolio in a Complete Market
Consider a portfolio with excess return, xi in state i. The probability of state i is










 2 1/2 . (36)
This is invariant to scaling so with no loss of generality we can ﬁx the expected
excess payoﬀ at any nonnegative value
 
pixi = ¯ x ≥ 0. Then maximizing the
Sharpe ratio of excess returns is equivalent to minimizing the mean squared payoﬀ











































The second-order condition for an interior minimum is also met.




i = λ − γ ˆ pi/pi . (39)
19The zero-net-wealth budget constraint is expressed here using the risk-neutral probabilities in
place of the state prices. Since the state price is e−rT ˆ pi, a portfolio with a risk-neutral expected
excess return of zero has a zero cost.





































i /pi − 1
λ = ¯ x + γ. (41)
So the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio is
x
∗
i = ¯ x + γ(1 − ˆ pi/pi). (42)













































i /pi − 1 . (44)
This ﬁnal sum can also be expressed as
 
pi(ˆ pi/pi)2 so the square of the maximal
Sharpe ratio is one less than the expectation of the square of the realized probability
likelihood ratio.
For a continuous state space indexed by ξ, similar analysis yields a maximal













20From (44) below, γ can also be written as γ = ¯ x/S2
∗.
28for a portfolio with an excess return of
x
∗(ξ) = ¯ x + γ[1 − ˆ p(ξ)/p(ξ)] (46)
where γ = ¯ x/S2
∗ and ˆ p(ξ) is the risk-neutral probability density for the state space.
If the state space is indexed by a lognormal return on a basis with a continuously-





















where φ(·) is the standard normal density function. The risk-neutral probability
density is the same with µ replaced by r, the continuously-compounded interest
rate.












































From (46) and (48), the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio is
x






























− 1 . (50)
29Because ξ is lognormally distributed with logarithmic mean E[ nξ] = (µ −
1
2σ2)T
and variance Var[ nξ] = σ2T, ξθ is also lognormally distributed with logarithmic
mean θ(µ −
1




























































B Maximal-Sharpe-Ratio Portfolio with Puts and Calls
































where Φ(·) is the standard cumulative normal function. All this is standard for
the Black-Scholes model where Z represents the stock price at maturity ST and so
¯ z =  nS0 + (µ −
1
2σ2)T and v2 = σ2T. The two additional results we need are the






































30Note that the three expressions in equation (52) are all special cases of (53). The
ﬁrst line is γ = 1, K = 0. The second and third lines are γ = 0and γ = 1.
The proof is straightforward. Let W ≡ Zγ, then w ≡  nW is normally distributed






















which reduces to the ﬁrst line in (53). Equation (54) follows by complementarity.
C Maximal-Sharpe-Ratio Portfolio with a History
Let ¯ xh and Qh denote the historical average excess return and average squared
excess return over the recording period so far. Let xi be the excess return in state i
each period in the future and α be the fraction of the total period which has passed.
Then the Sharpe ratio for the entire recording period is
S=
α¯ xh + (1 − α)
 
pixi  








The variance and hence the average or expected squared excess returns can be
expressed as a function of the Sharpe ratio and the average or expected returns so
the entire-period Sharpe ratio is
S=









f) − [α¯ xh + (1 − α)¯ xf]2
where ¯ xf ≡
 
pixi Sf ≡
¯ xf   
pix
2
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It is clear by inspection of (57) that the entire-period Sharpe ratio is monotonic
in the future Sharpe ratio. Therefore, maximizing it requires maximizing the future
Sharpe ratio by holding the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio as previously derived,
Sf =S ∗. The only remaining question is what leverage should be used.
31If ¯ xh ≤ 0, then the entire-period Sharpe ratio is monotonically increasing in ¯ xf







/(1 − α) − 1
 −1/2
. (58)
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[α¯ xh + (1 − α)¯ xf]3 .
(60)
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions gives the optimal leverage as
¯ x
∗


























32Table 1: Annual Perfect Sorting Ability Within 1-Digit SIC-CODE: Zero-Investment Portfolio Returns
SIC 0SIC 1 SIC 2 SIC 3 SIC 4 SIC 5 SIC 6 SIC 7 SIC 8 SIC 9 equal-weighted
Year Agriculture Mining Construction Manufacturing Utilities+ Wholesale Retail Finance+ Services Other portfolio
1981/01-12 0.332 0.499 0.504 0.553 0.444 0.583 0.471 0.613 0.825 0.655 0.5479
1982/01-12 0.537 0.743 0.621 0.723 0.506 0.911 0.507 0.806 0.751 3.180 0.9283
1983/01-12 0.819 0.564 0.549 0.667 0.432 0.672 0.481 0.658 0.606 0.574 0.6022
1984/01-12 0.261 0.445 0.438 0.462 0.446 0.502 0.411 0.507 0.621 0.754 0.4847
1985/01-12 1.337 0.491 0.561 0.587 0.429 0.625 0.573 0.801 0.750 0.509 0.6662
1986/01-12 0.589 0.595 0.516 0.547 0.429 0.579 0.419 0.581 0.548 1.048 0.5852
1987/01-12 0.899 0.606 0.519 0.593 0.397 0.581 0.381 0.659 0.654 0.184 0.5474
1988/01-12 0.342 0.510 0.469 0.567 0.416 0.639 0.336 0.655 0.608 nan 0.5046
1989/01-12 0.233 0.642 0.568 0.586 0.433 0.594 0.488 0.689 0.963 0.596 0.5793
1990/01-12 0.422 0.392 0.506 0.578 0.338 0.518 0.423 0.642 0.531 0.351 0.4702
1991/01-12 0.566 0.684 0.773 0.791 0.491 0.926 0.713 0.933 1.221 nan 0.7885
1992/01-12 0.599 0.516 0.496 0.681 0.335 0.653 0.494 0.787 0.695 nan 0.5840
1993/01-12 0.506 0.516 0.530 0.720 0.418 0.652 0.375 0.746 0.788 nan 0.5836
1994/01-12 0.304 0.383 0.494 0.581 0.338 0.532 0.285 0.681 0.575 nan 0.4637
1995/01-12 0.961 0.584 0.672 0.838 0.511 0.726 0.435 0.930 0.909 nan 0.7296
1996/01-12 0.818 0.873 0.548 0.740 0.499 0.692 0.373 0.923 0.684 nan 0.6834
1997/01-12 0.600 0.683 0.647 0.690 0.557 0.708 0.560 0.845 0.642 nan 0.6594
1998/01-12 1.199 0.716 0.598 0.781 0.597 0.869 0.413 1.135 0.838 nan 0.7939
1999/01-12 0.810 0.792 0.712 1.546 1.222 0.763 0.412 1.952 0.884 nan 1.0103
AvgNumPerPﬁo 9.8 110.2 410.5 611.8 313.2 251.2 643.8 209.2 68.5 2.2 263.0
Mean 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.70 0.49 0.67 0.45 0.82 0.74 0.87 0.64
Std.Dev. 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.90 0.15
Sharpe Ratio 2.05 4.44 6.49 3.05 2.54 5.37 4.68 2.61 4.33 0.97 4.26
3
3Table 2: Maximal Sharpe Ratio for Various Parameter Values
T = 1 Year T = 1 Month
σ µ − r σ µ − r
5% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15%
Maximal Sharpe 15% 0.343 0.748 1.311 15% 0.096 0.194 0.295
20% 0.254 0.533 0.869 20% 0.072 0.145 0.219
S∗ 25% 0.202 0.417 0.658 25% 0.058 0.116 0.175
Basis Sharpe 15% 0.323 0.631 0.923 15% 0.096 0.192 0.287
20% 0.241 0.471 0.690 20% 0.072 0.144 0.215
Sξ 25% 0.192 0.375 0.548 25% 0.058 0.115 0.172
Improvement 15% 6.0% 18.6% 42.0% 15% 0.5% 1.4% 2.8%
20% 5.2% 13.1% 26.0% 20% 0.4% 1.0% 1.9%
S∗/Sξ − 1 25% 5.2% 11.2% 20.0% 25% 0.4% 0.9% 1.5%
µapp − µ 15% 31.0 197.4 703.2 15% 2.4 14.1 42.4
in basis pts. 20% 26.7 139.1 430.3 20% 2.1 10.3 28.7
eq. (22) 25% 26.7 118.1 329.3 25% 2.1 8.9 22.9
Table 3: Skewness and Kurtosis of Maximal Sharpe Ratio Portfolio
T = 1 year T = 1 month
σ Skewness Kurtosis σ Skewness Kurtosis
Basis MSR Basis MSR Basis MSR Basis MSR
15% 0.456 –2.663 3.372 17.801 15% 0.130 –0.590 3.030 3.625
20% 0.614 –1.750 3.678 8.898 20% 0.174 –0.438 3.054 3.344
25% 0.778 –1.322 4.096 6.260 25% 0.217 –0.349 3.084 3.217
34Figure 1: The Sharpe Ratio Maximizing Portfolio.
3
5Figure 2: The Distribution of the Sharpe Ratio Maximizing Portfolio.
3
6Figure 3: Improvement in the Sharpe Ratio using One Call Option.
3
7Figure 4: Payoﬀ on the maximal-Sharpe-ratio portfolio with options.
3
8Figure 5: Maximizing the Sharpe Ratio with a History of Returns.
3
9Figure 6: Maximizing the Sharpe Ratio with a History of Returns.
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